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Abstract 
After its first thorough revision in 2005, the Stability & Growth Pact (SGP) has recently been transformed into a 
Fiscal Stability Treaty, which in all likelihood will become operational as from January 1, 2013. Part of this treaty 
is the incorporation of balanced budget rules into domestic constitutions and into national budgeting 
processes. These rules concern general government public finances and not only central government budgets. 
This paper discusses the effectiveness of such domestic rules for general government, by looking at the political 
capacity of EMU member states to domestically implement EMU fiscal rules in the period 2000-2007 (i.e. 
before the emergence of the financial crises). 
Compliance with the EMU rules varied considerably between the –then- euro-12. The paper shows that 
institutional arrangements to enhance fiscal discipline within central government had almost fully converged 
between eurozone members and cannot explain these compliance differences. Regarding non-central 
government sectors it is shown that countries with low compliance either used imposed (rather than agreed) 
internal stability pacts or did not have such pacts at all. 
Compliance problems are subsequently explained by looking at the political capacity of countries to deliberate 
the EMU stability paradigm with all actors involved. Four countries are looked at in particular: Ireland, Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Based on this case analysis it is argued that central governments that had a high 
level of ideological dispersion and competition (dispersed governments) were better in such deliberation than 
single-party or stable coalition central governments (non-dispersed or concentrated governments). Political 
backlash on the EMU stability paradigm can be expected to be more prominent in the latter case; the 
emergence of a modified EMU paradigm (and the resulting modification of the SGP) is mainly the result of 
political backlash on the original paradigm in these states. 
Finally, some lessons are drawn for the implementation of the new Fiscal Stability Treaty. 
 
Keywords: EMU, Stability & Growth Pact (SGP), Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), political capacity, fiscal policy, internal stability pacts 
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1-INTRODUCTION 
 
*…+ An escalating dispute between Madrid and Spain’s regional authorities risks undoing 
its austerity pledge to EU authorities. 
The conflict erupted on Tuesday (31 July) when Jose Antonio Grinan, the President of the 
Andalucia region, walked out of a meeting of Madrid’s Council of Fiscal and Financial 
Policy when it told him to cut another €3 billion from his 2012 budget. 
*…+ Regional spending was the main reason why Spain last year missed its deficit targets 
under EU rules: Andalucia and Catalonia between them have a GDP of €346 billion, or 32 
percent of the country’s total economy *…+. 
 
From: EUobserver.com, 27-8-2012 
 
From the outset the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (hereafter: SGP), aiming at curbing fiscal 
behaviour of EMU member states, has been the subject of much political and academic 
debate, following persistent compliance failures. After its first thorough revision in 2005, the 
SGP has recently been transformed into a Treaty on Fiscal Discipline (the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, hereafter: TSCG), which 
in all likelihood will become operational as from January 1, 2013. Part of this treaty is the 
incorporation of balanced budget rules into domestic constitutions and into national 
budgeting processes. 
As with the SGP, these fiscal rules concern general government public finances and not only 
central government budgets. As a consequence, from the nineties onwards, domestic fiscal 
stability pacts have been put in place in many E(M)U member states. This paper discusses 
the effectiveness of such domestic fiscal frameworks. The main question the paper tries to 
answer is: To what extent are EMU member states able to domestically implement EMU 
rules? 
 
The paper is structured as follows. 
In section 2 the theoretical background of domestic compliance with EMU rules is discussed. 
Section 3 deals with the fiscal performance of EMU member states (the euro-12) in the 
period 2000-2007, i.e. the period before the outbreak of the various financial crises (banking 
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crisis, eurocrisis). The empirical analysis is focused on the pre-crises period because since 
2008 almost all EMU member states show considerable compliance problems as a result of 
these crises, which makes the period 2008-2012 less suited for analysis.1 
In section 4 the institutional arrangements (i.e. the fiscal frameworks) that were used by 
EMU member states in the period 2000-2007 are dealt with, linking these arrangements to 
the type of government and to in-EMU performance. From this analysis it follows that 
institutional arrangements to enhance fiscal discipline within central government had almost 
fully converged between eurozone members before the outbreak of the financial crises, 
meaning that differences in these institutional arrangements cannot explain compliance 
differences. Regarding non-central government sectors we find however that countries with 
low compliance either used imposed (rather than agreed) internal stability pacts or did not 
have such pacts at all. 
In section 5 four countries are studied in some more detail: Ireland, Finland, Germany and 
the Netherlands. Based on this case analysis, in section 6 an explanation for compliance 
differences is offered by looking at the political capacity of countries to deliberate the EMU 
stability paradigm with all actors involved. It is argued that central governments that had a 
high level of ideological dispersion and competition were better in such deliberation than 
single-party or stable coalition central governments. Political backlash on the EMU stability 
paradigm can be expected to be more prominent in the latter case; the emergence of a 
modified EMU paradigm (and the resulting modification of the SGP) was mainly the result of 
political backlash on the original paradigm in these states. 
Section 7 discusses the implications of these findings for the implementation of the TSCG. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1
 See Schuknecht c.s. (2011) for a more detailed overview of fiscal developments (aggregated for the euro-12) 
in various periods (1992-1998, 1998-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2011).  
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2-DOMESTIC COMPLIANCE WITH EMU RULES 
In political economy, successful accession to and performance within the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) has been explained by (the combination of) two factors: political 
commitment to EMU rules through policy paradigm convergence and adequate budget 
institutions. 
Commitment to EMU rules is often asserted and explained by ideational or paradigm 
convergence amongst EU finance ministers through a process of normative deliberation and 
policy learning. Prior macroeconomic policy paradigm convergence on West German 
preferences for stability under ERM prepared other EU countries, especially France, to 
internalise fiscal policy restraint and later accept the creation of the SGP (Verdun 2000; 
Heipertz & Verdun 2004, 2005). A policy paradigm is a set of beliefs and assumptions, not 
only of policy recommendations, but also of the fundamental realities behind them, that 
make specific policy choices necessary (Goldstein 1993, p. 2-3). Key here is that the stability 
paradigm discredited public borrowing as a response to economic slowdown and favoured 
fiscal consolidation, structural adjustment and private economic investment instead. 
It has repeatedly been argued that adequate budget institutions are also necessary for 
effective implementation of EMU fiscal rules, as (paradigm-based) commitments to fiscal 
discipline might be undone by short-term electoral incentives and strategic game scenarios 
(Von Hagen and Harden 1994, 1995; Hallerberg et al 2001, 2007, 2009; Von Hagen 2002). In 
order to achieve fiscal discipline centralization of the budget process is needed which can be 
achieved through two different models. First, there are delegation models in which fiscal 
authority is delegated to specific actors (often a strong finance minister and/or prime 
minister) and are thus taken out of day-to-day political deliberations. Secondly, there are 
commitment or contract models in which all actors involved commit themselves to policy 
outcomes that are in line with EMU requirements. It is argued that governments made up of 
closely aligned parties with low competition among them (including single-party 
governments) generally prefer the delegation model, whereas countries with ideologically 
dispersed coalitions made up of parties which regularly compete against each other prefer 
fiscal contracts (Hallerberg et al 2007). 
Institutional engineering works from the assumption that policy commitments may be 
difficult to keep up due to time inconsistencies or collective action problems and seeks to 
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solve these, given commitment of all actors involved to the stability-oriented policy 
paradigm in principle. Had this worked in practice, then public deficits and borrowing in the 
eurozone should have declined over time, which they did not. The SGP compliance crisis of 
2003/2004, its subsequent reform in 2005 and the current euro-crisis refute the notion that 
the EMU fiscal discipline paradigm has subordinated all other claims on public finance 
and/or budgetary institutions have been adequate. 
It is argued here that in order to adequately explain in-EMU performance, policy paradigms, 
budget institutions and their interplay should be analysed in more detail using the concept 
of political capacity. Following Lehman (1969) political (or systemic) capacity is defined here 
as the ability to set, pursue and implement goals for the entire political system2. Building on 
that notion it is argued here that for intergovernmental commitments to work “all the way 
through” the stability paradigm has to be accepted and implemented in all domestic political 
subsystems. These include the domestic central government level (comprising the central 
government, parliament and national fiscal bodies), the domestic general government arena 
(comprising central government, the social security sector and sub-national governments) 
and the domestic popular arena (consisting of the electorate and other stakeholders). The 
key argument is that political capacity depends on the composition of government, in the 
sense that the political capacity to domestically implement EMU rules is greater in dispersed 
systems of government than in concentrated systems of government, mainly due to lesser 
electoral vulnerability and larger domestic political networks. This is contrary to most 
institutionalist literature which, by focusing on the role of veto players in central-
governmental decision-making, claims that dispersed governments are less able to 
effectuate paradigmatic change than non-dispersed governments. To a large extent the main 
difference between our argument and the prevailing institutionalist argument coincides with 
a difference in scope. This paper deals with systemic political capacity of central government 
vis-à-vis other domestic actors rather than with political control over veto players within 
central government. 
                                                 
2
 A similar definition has been put forward by Organski and Kugler (1980) who define political capacity as the 
ability of political systems to carry out the tasks chosen by a nation’s government in the face of domestic and 
international groups with competing priorities. 
ECPR - 6TH PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON EU POLITICS – TAMPERE – 13-15 SEPTEMBER 2012 
DSE/ECSA-DK – 2012 CONFERENCE – COPENHAGEN – 27-28 SEPTEMBER 2012 
 
6 
 
From the key argument it follows that it is expected that dispersed governments have a 
better record of implementation of and compliance with EMU rules than concentrated 
governments. In order to clarify this argument special attention will be paid to domestic 
political capacity, i.e. how (central) governments have implemented the rules of EMU and 
the SGP for general government, viz. by inclusion of non-central government sectors through 
internal stability pacts. This internal dimension is important but has not been fully 
researched3, as the institutionalist literature focuses on central government budget rules 
and procedures. Especially in the case of (federal) states where a considerable part of public 
finances is in the hands of sub-national governments (and especially if the sub-national 
public finances are cyclically sensitive), EMU implementation requires the involvement of all 
government sectors. According to Balassone et al (2004) there is a basic asymmetry in EMU’s 
set-up: EMU/SGP-rules apply to general government, compliance depends on the behavior 
of all levels of government, yet the central government alone is held accountable. This 
institutional imbalance is an incentive for central governments to use their political capacity 
vis-à-vis other government sectors. 
Moreover, it is interesting to see how low political capacity may even result in a process of 
politicisation of and backlash against the EMU policy paradigm and how this feeds back into 
intergovernmental deliberations. As Puetter (2006) has suggested, even though deliberative 
intergovernmentalism on the EU level provides crucial informal resources for national 
finance ministers to implement the EMU rules within their own jurisdictions, effective 
implementation can fail when finance ministers cannot bring to bear the same normative 
resources to legitimate restrictions on spending. This prevents paradigmatic achievements 
reached at the European level through intergovernmental deliberation from being applied to 
domestic debate. Application of restrictive policies can then result in politicisation of and 
political resistance to the policy goals inherent in the policy paradigm. SGP and/or TSCG 
implementation is therefore contingent on the political capacity of government to design 
economic policies in ways that avoid negative politicisation and backlash in the popular 
arena as a source of competing claims for policy cleavages. The interest in mechanisms of 
                                                 
3
 A notable exception is Enderlein (2006) who focuses on changes in domestic fiscal and wage-setting 
institutions (including social pacts) resulting from EMU membership. 
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politicisation, backlash and feedback reflects a broader theoretical interest in EU studies in 
domestic politics and backlash against EU policy (Schmitter 2004; Majone 2005). 
 
 
3-FISCAL PERFORMANCE OF EMU MEMBER STATES (2000-2007) 
The simplest way to measure compliance with EMU fiscal rules is to look at the use of the 
excessive deficit procedure (hereafter: EDP) as established in article 104c of the Maastricht 
Treaty and specified –for EMU members- in the SGP. The EDP is supplemented by the early 
warning mechanism to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. Table 1 shows the use 
of early warnings and the EDP for the euro-12 in the period 2000-2007. Out of these 12 
countries, six have been involved in an EDP, with Portugal being a second offender. 
 
Table 1. Early warnings and excessive deficit procedures (January 1999-April 2008), euro-12 only 
Country Early warnings 
recommended by 
Commission 
Early warnings 
issued by Council 
Excessive deficit procedure  (date of 
Commission Report; date of abrogation 
by Council) 
France November 2002 January 2003 April 2003; January 2007 
Germany January 2002  November 2002; May 2007 
Greece   May 2004; May 2007 
Italy April 2004  June 2005; ongoing 
Netherlands   April 2004; June 2005 
Portugal January 2002  September 2002; May 2004 
June 2005; ongoing 
Source: DG Ecofin  
 
For EMU members the SGP has an additional rule: their (general government) budget should 
be close to balance or in surplus in the medium term, i.e. over the business cycle. Using the 
AMECO database the cyclically adjusted fiscal stance of general government of the euro-12 
has been analyzed for the period 2000-20074. From this analysis it follows that three 
countries were exemplary fiscal consolidators: Finland, Luxembourg and Ireland, with an 
average fiscal position considerably in surplus and in all years much better than the euro-12 
                                                 
4
 We have used the cyclically adjusted net-lending or net-borrowing of general government with the 
adjustment based on potential GDP used in the EDP. 
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average. A second group of countries, made up of Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands, had 
a fiscal stance close to balance and sporadically did worse than the euro-12 average. Austria 
and Germany were problematic consolidators with an average net-borrowing position of 1.3 
and 2.1 percent GDP respectively. These countries performed worse than the euro-12 
average in most years. Finally, there was a group made up of France, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece with cyclically adjusted negative fiscal positions close to or in excess of 3.0 percent 
GDP. 
Interestingly, in all cases there was hardly any difference over time throughout the 2000-
2007 period in performance of individual countries compared to the euro-12 average. There 
was no improvement or deterioration over time of countries’ performance relative to one 
another. A country either underperformed or overperformed, with Austria being the –only- 
exception to this rule as it alternated relatively good performance with bad performance. 
Furthermore, for the euro-12 as a whole the period 2001-2004 was a period with rather high 
negative fiscal positions (on average: -2.6% GDP) but the average structural fiscal stance 
improved over the period 2005-2007 to -0.7% GDP in 2007. 
 
In order to have more insight in the composition of the fiscal stance of general government, 
the actual fiscal positions of the euro-12 in 2000-20075 were broken down into central 
government, state government (if applicable), regional/local government and social security 
funds, as shown in graph 1 for all euro-12. 
 
                                                 
5
 As the AMECO database is limited to general government, EUROSTAT data have been used which do break 
down the fiscal position of general government but unfortunately are not cyclically adjusted. For Greece data 
are only available for 2002-2007. 
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Graph 1. Development and composition of net-lending (+) or net-borrowing (-) of government sectors, in % GDP, 
euro-12 (2000-2007) 
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Data: EUROSTAT 
 
On this aggregate level the impact of sub-national finances and social security funds seems 
to be twofold. First, in the 2002-2005 period -and especially in 2003- these sectors 
aggravated the central government position, pushing general government towards the 
dreaded 3 percent line. Secondly, at the beginning and end points (2000-2001, 2006-2007) 
especially the social security funds had a positive impact on the general government fiscal 
position. 
Table 2 lists the findings of similar analyses for the individual twelve countries (in order of 
declining structural performance of general government as established above). From the 
findings it follows that most problematic or bad performers had considerable compliance 
problems or compliance risks in these non-central government sectors (this is especially true 
for Germany, Italy and France), whereas exemplary and good performers had not. 
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Table 2. Fiscal performance of non-central government sectors, 2000-2007, euro-12 
Country State government (for 
federal countries only) 
Regional/local government Social security funds 
 Pattern Position Pattern Position Pattern Position 
Finland   = - = ++ 
Ireland   = 0 = + 
Luxembourg   = 0 ≈ ++ 
Belgium = + = - A≈ + 
Netherlands   = - = 0 
Spain = - = 0 = ++ 
Austria = 0 = + = 0 
Germany ≈ -- ≈ 0 ≈ 0 
France   A-typical 
 
Falling from + 
to -  
≈ -- 
Greece   = 0 = ++ 
Italy   ≈ --  = + 
Portugal   = - ≈ ++ 
 
Pattern =: steady, non-cyclical; ≈: cyclical, more or less in sync with central government; A≈: countercyclical to 
central government 
Position 0: average position over 2000-2007 in balance (between +0.15 and -0.15 % GDP); position – resp. +:  
small deficit/surplus (between 0.15 and 0.5 % GDP); position -- resp. ++: large deficit/surplus (larger than 0.5 % 
GDP) 
Own calculations based on EUROSTAT data 
 
In those cases where the fiscal position of the social security funds was stable and in balance 
or surplus, or cyclical but in (large) surplus, or countercyclical, this sector did not create 
problems with EMU compliance; on the contrary: these funds then acted as a cushion that 
softened the blow. This is true for ten out of the euro-12; it is true for all exemplary and 
good performers. France and Germany stand out as their social security funds were cyclical 
but on average not in surplus. 
The regional/local government in nine out of the twelve cases was a-cyclical and showed a 
surplus or a small deficit. In two cases the regional/local public finances were cyclically 
sensitive: in Germany this potential problem was limited because the fiscal position of this 
sector was in balance, in contrast to Italy where it had an average deficit over 2000-2007 of 
0.6 percent GDP. The regional/local sector in France followed an a-typical pattern with a 
fiscal stance that gradually dwindled from a surplus of 0.2 percent GDP in 2000 to a deficit of 
0.4 percent GDP in 2007. 
ECPR - 6TH PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON EU POLITICS – TAMPERE – 13-15 SEPTEMBER 2012 
DSE/ECSA-DK – 2012 CONFERENCE – COPENHAGEN – 27-28 SEPTEMBER 2012 
 
11 
 
If we look at the federal states Germany stands out again, as the Länder finances were 
cyclical (contrary to the state government sectors in Belgium, Spain and Austria) and showed 
a relatively high average deficit (0.9 percent GDP on average in 2000-2007). 
 
 
4-INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (2000-2007) 
 
Institutional arrangements for central government 
As was put forward in the introduction, theoretically the choice between a delegation model 
and a contracts model depends on the ideological distance and level of political competition 
among government parties. Based on indicators6 for these two variables Hallerberg et al 
(2007, 2009) have come up with expected forms of fiscal governance for the EU-15. From 
their analysis it follows that throughout the period under consideration here (2000-2007) 
Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg and The Netherlands were expected contracts states. Austria, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain were expected delegation states. 
In three countries (Austria, as of 2000; Ireland, as of 1998; Italy; as of 1997) the political 
context changed in such a way that they changed from expected contract states to expected 
delegation states immediately prior to or in the early years of EMU.  
Research on the actual use of procedural and numerical fiscal rules on the central 
government level is abundant (Hallerberg et al 2001, 2007, 2009; Hallerberg and Bridwell 
2008; European Commission 2006, 2007; Groenendijk 2006). From this literature it follows 
that the delegation and contracts models are archetypical; in reality all countries use both 
delegation elements and contracts elements. Examples of delegation elements are a high 
agenda-setting power of the minister of finance in budgetary planning, centralization of 
budget negotiations and the existence of cash limits during budget execution. Delegation 
elements mainly refer to budgetary procedures. The contract (or: numerical) approach 
mainly concerns institutionalized political commitment to the use of (multi-annual) fiscal 
                                                 
6
 These indicators include the average number of parties in government, changes in coalition or ruling party, 
and the mean ideological range of coalition parties. This last indicator is computed following Tsebelis (2002). 
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targets or outcomes. Table 3 shows indices for the existence of delegation and contracts 
elements for the euro-12, prior to (1991) and in-EMU (2004). 
 
Table 3. Delegation and contracts index (0-1), central government budgeting (euro-12, 1991 and 2004)  
 Delegation index Contracts index 
 1991 2004 1991 2004 
Delegation states 0.49 0.68 0.43 0.73 
Contracts states 0.38 0.54 0.43 0.78 
Own calculations for euro-12, based on data in Hallerberg et al (2007)
 7
 
 
Prior to EMU expected delegation countries relied a bit more on delegation measures than 
expected contracts states, but expected delegation countries and expected contracts 
countries did not differ at all as far the use of contract elements is concerned. Due to a 
considerable increase in the number of fiscal rules (multi-annual frameworks, budget 
balance rules, expenditure rules, revenue rules and debt rules, all possibly ranging from 
central government to local government), which followed a more general trend that started 
in the early 1990s, in-EMU both the delegation aspect and the contracts aspect of central 
government budgeting have been strengthened, interestingly enough to the same extent by 
both expected delegation and expected contracts states. 
 
Hallerberg et al (2007), the European Commission (2006, 2007) and the OECD/World Bank 
Budget Practices and Procedures Database (based on data for 2003, updated in 2007) 
provide scores on budgetary institutions for individual countries for the period under 
consideration in this paper. These data have been extensively analysed trying to link to them 
to fiscal performance as discussed in the previous section, by using and (re)calculating 
different indices for budgetary procedures and rules, for the four different groups 
(exemplary, good, problematic and bad performers), at different points of time. Our 
unequivocal conclusion is that exemplary and good performers did not have better budget 
                                                 
7
 Including the annex to Hallerberg et al (2007) on http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~mhalle2/research.html. 
ECPR - 6TH PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON EU POLITICS – TAMPERE – 13-15 SEPTEMBER 2012 
DSE/ECSA-DK – 2012 CONFERENCE – COPENHAGEN – 27-28 SEPTEMBER 2012 
 
13 
 
institutions (at the central government level) than problematic and bad performers8. The 
procedural rules concerning budget planning, approval and implementation seem to have 
almost fully converged among the euro-12, as has the use of numerical rules. 
 
Institutional arrangements for non-central government: internal stability pacts 
Not only has the number of fiscal rules generally increased over the past twenty years; there 
has also been increased coverage of the government sub-sectors (European Commission 
2006). While in the early 90s such rules were mostly applied to territorial (i.e. regional and 
local) governments, in the later years they have been increasingly applied to the general 
government sector and to the social security sub-sector. The nature of these new rules was 
different though, as they were frequently based on agreements without strong compliance 
mechanisms, whereas the rules applied to sub-national governments often were enshrined 
in regulation. Interestingly enough, there was a clear difference between expected 
delegation and expected contracts states. Expected delegation states had a higher number 
of (numerical) fiscal rules implemented at regional and local level than contracts states, but 
relatively few rules for general government and the social security sector. The larger political 
dispersion of governments in expected contract states seems to promote fiscal rules at the 
central level mainly, whereas expected delegation states relied on relatively few rules at the 
central level and put more emphasis on rules to fiscally constrain regional and local 
governments. 
 
The (updates of the) 1999-2007 Stability Programmes of the euro-12 shed some light on the 
use of so called internal stability pacts in the period 2000-2007. In the –scant- literature on 
such pacts (Balassone et al 2004; OECD 2003, 2005) two approaches are mentioned: a 
cooperative approach which is thought to be especially suited for federal states, and a rules-
based approach which is more suitable for unitary states. However, as with the delegation 
                                                 
8
 That does not mean that institutions do not matter. There are clear suggestions in the research literature that 
on an aggregate level budgetary procedures and budgetary outcomes are linked (European Commission 2006, 
2007). 
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versus contracts idea for central government, in practice countries make different choices 
and often adopt eclectic approaches. 
Some of the euro-12 have simply relied on existing rules regarding balanced budgets and/or 
borrowing restrictions for regional and local government and have deemed these to be 
sufficient. This applies to our three exemplary performers: Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg. 
In Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (one problematic and two good performers) so 
called agreed internal stability pacts were established, which were not enshrined in legal 
acts. In Austria a financial burden sharing agreement was agreed upon in 2000 (for 2000-
2005) and was reinstated in 2004 and 2007 for subsequent periods. The Austrian pact 
contained specific fiscal targets and a SGP-like penalty system. In Belgium an agreement on 
an internal stability pact was reached in 2000 and has been updated since. In the Belgian 
system the High Finance Council (a consultative body) sets fiscal targets for the different 
entities and is in charge of monitoring communities and regions; regions act as watchdogs 
for local government. In 2003 this system was supplemented by peer review on the 
communities and regions level. The Netherlands has been relying on existing rules until 2004 
when an administrative agreement was conducted between central and local government, 
which primarily focuses on the improvement of information on the fiscal stance of local 
government, but which also contains reference values for local government deficits. 
Introduction of top-down regulatory frameworks similar to the SGP itself, sometimes 
referred to as imposed internal stability pacts (Balassone et al 2004) can be witnessed in 
Spain (as from 2003), Italy (introduced in 1999), Greece (introduced in 2004) and Portugal 
(introduced in 2002). These countries made use of either their annual budget laws (Italy) or 
specific budgetary stability laws (Spain, Greece, and Portugal). In all cases the framework 
included monitoring mechanisms and the possibility of corrective measures. Of this group, 
only Spain has held to the SGP without difficulty. 
In Germany the discussion on a national stability pact became part of a broader and ongoing 
discussion on the future of the German federal system. In the meantime, as from 2003, the 
coordinative role of the Financial Planning Council (in which all government levels are 
represented) has been strengthened and agreement was reached between the different 
levels of government on how to share a possible SGP-sanction. Something similar goes for 
France where implementation of EMU rules on the sub-national level became part of a 
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larger modernization process of the French public finances. France was still very much in the 
stage of raising awareness of the importance of EMU rules; to that end in 2006 the first 
National Public Finance Conference was held. 
 
Conclusion on institutional arrangements 
As far as the non-central government level is concerned, all expected contract states have 
used either existing rules or agreed pacts, whereas the outcome for expected delegation 
states is not clear: they used existing rules, agreed pacts, imposed pacts, or were still on 
their way towards a pact. Generally, expected delegation states had a higher number of 
(numerical) fiscal rules implemented at regional and local level than contracts states. On the 
central government level we have established that the distinction between delegation states 
and contract states did not hold when it came to actual institutional arrangements, as these 
arrangements have almost fully converged among the euro-12. 
However, it is also clear that all problematic and bad performers were expected delegation 
states; with the exception of Ireland and Spain all exemplary and good performers were 
expected contracts states. Ideological dispersion (which underlies the distinction between 
expected delegation and expected contract states) thus seems to be an important variable. 
Because the expectations regarding fiscal governance that are inherent in the use of the 
terms expected delegation countries and expected contracts countries obviously do not hold 
(any more), we will from now on refrain from the use of these terms. For the sake of clarity 
we will refer (as we already did in section 2) to these states as having concentrated 
governments or dispersed governments.9 
 
For explaining compliance such dispersion, and mechanisms of politicization of and backlash 
on government policies, are probably far more important than adequate budgetary 
institutions at the central government level as the latter have become a constant for the 
euro-12. This finding is in line with those of Hallerberg et al (2007) and Hallerberg and 
                                                 
9
 As the classification by Hallerberg et al. (2007) of countries in expected delegation countries and expected 
contracts countries was already based on ideological/political dispersion, the classification of countries in 
concentrated/dispersed government systems is identical to the delegation/contracts classification. 
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Bridwell (2008) who argue that the choice and impact of institutions to strengthen fiscal 
discipline in the end depend critically on the wider political environment. 
 
 
5-CASE ANALYSIS 
The findings on fiscal performance and institutional configurations are surprising in that 
countries with the greatest clarity of political responsibility and authority performed worst in 
budget restraint. Countries that had single-party or stable-coalition governments, that 
should have allowed key central government actors to impose a coherent logic on line 
ministries and non-central government (with or without a negotiated contract), obviously 
failed to do so. One possible and obvious explanation involves a systematic difference 
between southern EMU member states on the one hand and the other EMU member states 
on the other. The four worst performers in the period 2000-2007 (France, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece) may have had in common that fiscal consolidation was at odds with their 
fundamental fiscal doctrine. Obviously, this does not explain the position of Spain as a good 
performer or the positions of Austria and Germany as problematic performers. One could of 
course point to some specific and unsystematic features of these countries in terms of 
economic developments; in the case of Germany the re-unification has obviously had a 
negative impact on fiscal performance. 
Following the key argument that was put forward in section 2, in this section four selected 
countries are discussed to see if politicization and backlash have been more prevalent (in the 
period 2000-2007) in countries with concentrated governments than in countries with 
dispersed governments, allowing for the systematic explanation by looking at non-southern 
EMU member states only. The Stability Programmes of Ireland, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands have been analyzed for the period 2000-2007, as well as Commission 
assessments and (recommendations for) Council opinions. This set of four consists of two 
countries with concentrated governments, made up of a problematic performer (Germany) 
and an exemplary one (Ireland) and of two countries with dispersed governments (the 
Netherlands and Finland). The Netherlands was chosen to match Germany because this 
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country was the closest to Germany in terms of growth and unemployment rates in the 
period under consideration10. The same goes for Finland which matches Ireland.  
 
Ireland 
In the period 2000-2007 Ireland was a country with stable coalitions, a unitary system of 
government, an intensively-used corporatist system of wage negotiations and strong budget 
surpluses. The latter were channeled into a contingency, or ‘rainy day’ fund, invested in 
future pension obligations, and in infrastructure, especially housing, telecommunications 
and roads. Multi-annual financial plans were introduced in 2004 and bi-monthly reports of 
line ministries to the Finance Ministry ensured oversight of expenditure. 
A constant priority of the Irish Stability Reports in this period was the need to promote 
economic development and social improvement through public and private investment, 
even at the cost of higher-than-average inflation in a strong-growth environment. This 
meant low income and corporate taxes (to encourage work and company investment), 
increasing the supply of labour and foreign direct investment  from outside Ireland and 
removing infrastructural bottlenecks to further development. Housing investment was seen 
both as an economic (immigration-promoting) and a social necessity. The second constant 
priority was the alleviation of poverty, through employment, greater public housing and 
through increased pensions for the elderly. A major change has been the switch to domestic-
led demand since 2005, attributed to economic development and rising asset prices. 
The Irish government stressed that development must be brought forward as quickly as 
possible (whilst EU structural development funds were being paid). For this reason, it 
consistently rejected Commission (and more mutedly, Council) demands that government 
should reduce investment in infrastructure and housing to bring inflation levels down to 
Maastricht criteria parameters. The government underlined this in its 2001 rebuttal11 to 
admonitions to reduce public investment. Although Irish inflation had declined by then, 
removing worries about an overheating economy, public investment remained just as strong 
                                                 
10
 To this end we have calculated differentials for real growth and unemployment, for all individual countries 
relative to the euro-12 average, based on data from the AMECO database. 
11
 Intervention by the Irish Minister at ECOFIN on the Irish Stability Programme, 12 February 2001. 
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as before, especially on social affairs. Commission and Council assessments were more 
friendly to such investment after 2005 than before, which coincided with a reduction in Irish 
inflation. 
 
Finland 
In the period 2000-2007 Finland was a country with broad and changing political coalitions. 
Finland suffered deep general government deficits in the early 90s but reduced expenditure 
to generate steady central government surpluses throughout 2000-2007. Parties agreed that 
budget surpluses were imperative to cover the future cost of ageing on social security 
sectors of the Finnish budget. Local government was generally in balance and the social 
security sector had a steady surplus of 2 percent GDP. Changes in government did not affect 
this performance. Coalition agreements set multi-year expenditure ceilings, which became 
more politically binding in 2004. Some cyclically fluctuating expenditure (like unemployment 
subsidies) was excluded from these ceilings. Differences between actual tax revenues and 
expected revenues resulted in fiscal outcomes that deviated from projected outcomes. 
Public debt was partly reduced by means of privatisation revenues. 
Finland had robust GDP growth in 2000 (5.6%) which stalled in 2001 and resumed after 
2003. Despite this, Finland’s parties agreed that employment creation as a way to reducing 
poverty and social exclusion was the country’s top economic policy priority. Incentive-based 
measures such as tax reductions, labour market reform and promoting entrepreneurship 
figured highly in the Finnish Stability Programmes. Although Commission and Council 
warned in 2000 and 2001 that tax cuts and spending could undermine SGP commitments, 
Finnish governments neither subordinated employment promotion to SGP requirements, 
criticised the rules or strayed from their medium-term pattern of considerable budget 
surpluses. There are no references to politicisation of the stability paradigm. Public support 
of the EMU did steadily rise in Finland from 70% in the spring of 1999 to 81% in the spring of 
200712. 
 
                                                 
12
 Eurobarometer nr. 51 and nr. 67. 
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Germany 
In the period 2000-2007 Germany was a country with stable coalitions, with repeated 
federal attempts to negotiate a binding national stability pact, with extended attempts to 
negotiate corporatist wage bargains, both unsuccessful, and problematic public finances. 
Internal agreements between the different government levels were limited to surveillance 
and distribution of EU financial penalties and have had little effect on the sub-national 
governments. Political capacity to ensure balanced budgets beyond the Finance Ministry was 
poor. 
A constant theme of German Stability Reports until 2007 underlined poor economic growth 
rooted in the (questionable) stagnation of the world economy preventing an export-led 
economic recovery or continued stagnation of the domestic economy due to ‘abnormal 
imbalances’ when the world economy is growing. The SGP paradigm was rejected in nearly 
all policy areas or cutbacks were rolled back later. Social security cuts planned in 2004 to 
meet Commission and Council demands were partially reversed due to political criticism. 
Cutbacks to unemployment and pension benefits were softened in 2007, planned reductions 
in fiscal cross-state transfers to East Germany were rescinded in 2008. Election-driven 
demands for the return of tax subsidies for commuters also became loud that year, and the 
Finance Ministry found itself fighting line ministries over principles of the relative 
importance of international aid and investment in education, research and development and 
SGP rules in spring 2008. Council and Commission reports underlined the reversal of 
cutbacks and the inability of the German government to improve finances sufficiently during 
the 2007 upswing. This is buttressed by German stability reports between 1999 and 2007 
failing to consolidate budgets until export-led employment growth increased government 
revenues. 
Germany’s internal weakness in making budget consolidation a priority was reflected in 
repeated government demands for lower ECB interest rates and allowances in the budget 
limits for various forms of investment in the future, particularly research, development and 
education. Starting in 2000, when the Lisbon strategy was launched, German demands to 
bracket borrowing to finance these areas from deficit consideration became a lasting, 
principled counter to the constraints of the Excessive Deficit Procedure.  
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The Netherlands 
In 2000-2007 the Netherlands was a country with broad and changing coalition 
governments. Multi-annual fiscal frameworks were set by means of coalition agreements 
and were updated on a yearly basis. This framework worked with expenditure ceilings that 
were based on conservative growth estimates. Fiscal windfalls were used to decrease the 
fiscal deficit and/or for tax cuts; fiscal setbacks had to be compensated within the 
constraints of the expenditure ceilings. If tax cuts were possible these were directed 
primarily at closing the poverty gap in order to give incentives for labour market 
participation. Public investment, especially in measures to deal with increasing mobility, 
have largely been financed out of the Economic Structure Reinforcement Fund, which was 
funded by revenues from natural gas sales and privatisation. Thus fund was however an 
integral part of the general government budget. 
A fiscal surplus for general government was reached in 1999 and 2000, but due to slower 
economic growth as from 2001, deficits were run in 2001-2005. Because of an unexpected 
deterioration in the fiscal stance of local government the deficit breached 3 percent GDP and 
the EDP was invoked. Measures were taken to improve the fiscal stance, by expenditure 
reduction and through higher health insurance premiums. An administrative agreement was 
reached in 2004 with local government on how to deal with EMU requirements. In 2006 
general government once again reached a budgetary surplus, helped in part through rising 
gas and oil receipts. Throughout the 2000-2007 period the medium-term objective of a 
budget in balance or surplus has never been questioned by the Dutch government in its 
Stability Programmes. 
 
These four country cases show higher politicised questioning of SGP principles in Ireland and 
Germany, with concentrated governments, than in Finland and the Netherlands, with 
dispersed governments, despite economic downturns and fiscal pressure in three of these 
countries. Finland and the Netherlands took the stability paradigm as a given, whereas 
Ireland and Germany failed to politically pre-empt or contain competing political demands 
on economic policy and accompanying paradigms. 
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6-DELIBERATION AND CONTESTED PARADIGMS 
Why did concentrated governments perform less and did they challenge the EMU paradigm 
more often than dispersed governments? Let us assume that it is the norm for political 
commitment to fiscal paradigms to be limited in scope and to be contested unless a 
negotiated agreement exists to extend their consequences beyond the finance ministry. In 
countries with coalition governments comprised of substitutable partners, the need for 
consensus is apparent, as the government stands or falls on the agreement. Sub-national 
governments with independent authority to borrow, tax and spend must also agree on the 
policies, and rules governing social security funds (that have an equally independent impact 
on national finances) must be included so that they conform with fiscal consolidation plans. 
The key issue is not the multilevel character of government per se, but agreement on what 
the implementation of the policy paradigm means for the existing guaranteed rights of sub-
national governments and for stakeholders in social security systems (often represented by 
social partners). This domestic policy deliberation is the means by which political capacity of 
central government over sub-national governments and the social security community needs 
to be constructed. Where a government cannot or does not pursue this strategy, political 
capacity will be more frequently blocked by politicization and backlash based on policy 
principles that contradict the legitimacy of the policies of central government. 
Collective action is based not only on how interests are pursued in an institutional 
environment (Scharpf 1988), but also on policy paradigm consensus (Schmidt 2003).   
Schmidt and Radaelli’s work on discursive institutionalism (2004) bring principles and 
institutions together to argue that policy principles may fail if certain policy actors with veto 
powers remain unconvinced. They suggest that unitary systems of government may 
communicate radical new policies directly to voters and build legitimacy there, whilst 
countries with further veto players coordinate amongst themselves at the expense of 
communication with voters, diluting the capacity to translate paradigmatic change into 
policy change.  
From the analysis here, however, it follows that a deliberative paradox that impedes 
implementation is likely to be strongest in precisely those countries that have unitary 
governments, for two reasons. First, regarding the popular arena, voters can easily identify 
governments with authority and punish them at the polls. Politically concentrated 
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governments may therefore be more vulnerable to electoral pressure to support competing 
policy principles than broad coalition governments where possible blame is easily diffused 
among all coalition partners. This argument has also been made by Zohlnhöfer (2007) in his 
application of the literature on blame avoidance to the politics of budget consolidation. 
Second, regarding the general government arena, broad coalition governments, because 
they consist of politicians from a multitude of parties, have extended political networks that 
assist adherence with agreements (with social partners, with sub-national governments) 
whereas unitary governments have limited political networks. Through these extended 
networks broad coalition governments have a better basis for system-wide deliberation. 
Both factors (electoral vulnerability and restricted political networks) will have an impact on 
the political capacity to put policy paradigms into practice. Therefore concentrated 
governments (that are most vulnerable in electoral terms and have limited political 
networks) have the least ability to place EMU-conforming corsets on economic and social 
policy. They ‘cannot engineer politics out of fiscal decisions’ and are a distinct source of 
political backlash and critique of the EMU paradigm. Attempts to implement the SGP raise 
questions over the scope of policy that were previously unarticulated, touching the budgets 
of line ministries, sub-national governments and social security. Some of these opposing 
principles include the fiscal autonomy of the regional governments, and the special 
treatment of social security programmes as highly sensitive personal transfers funded out of 
special payroll contributions. This politicization provides the possible backlash.  
 
That leaves us with the way politicization and backlash has fed into the deliberations on the 
EU level. In the introduction it was argued that such feedback has changed the EMU 
paradigm resulting in the 2005 revision of the SGP. The original EMU stability paradigm was 
very much about fiscal trajectories, about steady and rapid decrease of deficits towards 
balances and surpluses, much in line with the idea of pre-EMU convergence inherent in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The modified EMU paradigm –which incorporates backlash from its 
predecessor- focused on the main political issue of fiscal restraint itself and how it fits in 
with the broader issue of economic stabilization. It allowed for more time for budget 
consolidation and for more protected areas of the budget. 
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Feedback has primarily occurred through the Council of Ministers. The role of promoting 
paradigm change at the European level has fallen to those countries which have the most 
direct political backlash by voters, where attempts to institute constraints on public 
spending have been most heavily fought and reversed. The critique has been on two levels: 
first, on the level of the EMU paradigm itself, and secondly, on the level of the Commission’s 
remit to oversee and enforce the EMU/SGP-rules. On the paradigm-related issues, it can be 
said that the Council’s new incorporation of Lisbon goals and its focus on medium-term 
performance represented an incremental loosening of the policy corset paradigm that 
member states used to face. Social security spending was not bracketed directly, but 
investment in future productive capacity was given special consideration in a way that was 
not considered before. This was as much a result of (Irish) demands that investment should 
continue regardless of the inflation rate as of (German) demands that it should continue 
regardless of the deficit. It has been effectively de-coupled due to policy deliberation at the 
national level that spilled back into deliberations in the Council. Accommodative Council 
assessments of Stability Programmes underline this. The Commission adapted to the 
Council’s take on a post-EMU paradigm by further developing proposals for budget 
consolidation over the long term and for approving some public borrowing (for financing 
structural adjustment) and not approving others. 
 
 
7-WHAT LESSONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TSCG? 
To what extent does the TSCG differ from the post-EMU paradigm that emerged with the 
2005 SGP revision? The basic fiscal rule that E(M)U member states have to adhere to 
according to the TSCG is identical to that of the current SGP: budgets should be in balance or 
in surplus. Assessment of whether a country’s budget is in balance is based on the country-
specific MTO (medium term objective). The TSCG (and the so-called six-pack of legislative 
acts that entered into force in December 2011) are a bit more specific about the deviations 
from and adjustments towards this MTO, but generally the TSCG repeatedly mentions that 
the assessment will take place “in line with the revised Stability and Growth Pact”. 
The main new elements of the TSCG are the following: 
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- The fiscal rules have to be incorporated into national law of the contracting parties 
through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, 
or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national 
budgetary process; 
- Correction mechanisms shall be put in place at the national level that start working in the 
event of significant observed deviations from the MTO or the adjustment towards it; 
- In case of non-compliance with the above (i.e. if contracting parties do not fully 
incorporate the rules and correction mechanism into their national framework) the 
European Commission and/or another contracting party can bring the matter to the 
Court of Justice. 
The 2011 country fiches of European Commission (2012a and 2012b) on the fiscal 
frameworks of EU member states show that currently many member states have a multi-
annual fiscal framework that covers the whole of general government, but few have a 
framework that has a legal basis in a constitution (or an equivalent legal basis) and 
incorporates automatic correction mechanisms, which means that considerable changes in 
the institutional frameworks have or will be brought about in 2012 and 2013 (member states 
are expected to comply with the TSCG within one year after it becomes operational).  
 
But does the TSCG change the political capacity of member states to domestically implement 
EMU fiscal rules? The TSCG clearly re-inforces the top-down enforcement mechanisms of the 
Commission and Council, it ordains the implementation of EMU fiscal rules into national 
fiscal frameworks, but it does not address the how of such implementation. 
As Eichengreen (2012: 125, 129) states: fiscal discipline cannot be outsourced. European 
fiscal problems can only be solved at the national level, not by EU-level surveillance.13 From 
the previous sections it has become clear that rules can be put into institutional 
arrangements that are then monitored by the EU, but actual compliance depends on 
acceptance throughout the domestic political systems of the underlying policy paradigm, as 
                                                 
13
 Hallerberg (2011) takes this argument even one step further by posing the question whether the European 
fiscal framework (surveillance combined with support) discourages meaningful domestic reform (and thus 
works counterproductive). 
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the result of deliberation in the popular and general government arenas. It is highly 
questionable whether the top-down approach of the TSCG contributes to such deliberation. 
 
 
8-CONCLUSION 
In this paper it was established that the distinction between (expected) delegation states 
and (expected) contract states, that is at the heart of the literature on domestic budgetary 
institutions of EMU member states, does not truly hold in a positive sense, as the in-EMU 
institutional arrangements on the central government level have almost fully converged 
among the euro-12 at the end of the period 2000-2007. There was however a difference 
between expected delegation (or: non-dispersed, or: concentrated) states and expected 
contracts (or: dispersed) states as far as their ability to implement fiscal rules for general 
government was concerned. Dispersed states either used –sufficient- existing regulatory 
frameworks or agreed-upon internal stability pacts. Non-dispersed states used existing rules, 
agreed or imposed pacts or did not yet have such pacts. Generally, non-dispersed states had 
a higher number of fiscal rules implemented at the sub-national level than dispersed states. 
In short: dispersed states do better when it comes to fiscal discipline. 
 
The case analysis of two countries with concentrated governments (Ireland and Germany) 
and two countries with dispersed governments (Finland and the Netherlands) seems to 
suggest that indeed concentrated governments are more inclined to emphasize the political 
impacts of EMU rules and accordingly question the EMU stability paradigm. Subsequently we 
have argued that there must be a distinct difference in political capacity to implement the 
EMU policy paradigm and SGP rules (to which all EMU member states have committed 
themselves) between concentrated governments and dispersed governments. Contrary to 
some of the literature, it was argued that dispersed governments have higher political 
capacity than concentrated governments due to lower vulnerability in the popular arena and 
due to their possibility to use extended networks in the general government arena. 
 
Our –tentative- analysis of the TSCG showed that these issues are not addressed at all by the 
new Treaty, which follows a top-down approach aimed at increased surveillance and 
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enforcement by the EU, simply assuming acceptance of the SGP/EMU/TSCG policy paradigm 
of fiscal prudence throughout the political systems of all 25 contracting parties. 
 
The implications of these findings are threefold. 
First, there is a need to deepen our understanding of the relationship between the political 
capacity of governments and their composition. The existing literature on veto players and 
unitary/non-unitary governments is of limited use here, as this literature focuses on political 
control within governments rather than on the systemic capacity of governments to 
implement and enforce policies beyond central government itself.  
Second, in light of the increased attention within EU studies for politicization of and backlash 
against EU policies, the case of EMU and the SGP is one that should not be studied in 
isolation. Further research should focus on comparing the EMU/SGP case with other 
contended EU policy fields. 
Third, member states should combine implementation of the TSCG-rules with deliberation 
on the underlying policy paradigm in the popular and general government arenas. 
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